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S H O R T A R T I C L EShow Me Your Friends: A Survey Experiment
on the Effect of Coalition Signals
Albert Falcó-Gimeno, University of Barcelona
Jordi Muñoz, University of BarcelonaRecent studies of coalition-directed voting suggest that what political parties say during a campaign can influence voter
perceptions of the likelihood of certain coalitions and that this, in turn, may foster strategic voting in multiparty systems.
Here, we expand this argument and show that preelection coalition signals also have the potential to influence voter per-
ceptions of the parties themselves. By revealing their coalition preferences, parties provide information on where they stand
on the political continuum. We test our argument using a survey experiment run during a regional election campaign in
Spain in which we manipulated the coalition signals emitted by two parties: one, a traditional social democratic party and,
the second, a new liberal party. Results show how coalition signals can significantly influence the party’s position and,
ultimately, affect voters’ stated probability of voting, especially in the case of the recently founded party.uring election campaigns in multiparty systems, it is
common for parties to discuss their, and their rivals’,
likely postelection coalition behavior. In many Euro-
pean party systems, liberal parties will tend to lean either to-
ward parties to their left or, rather, to the conservatives, while
social democrats will often seek out possibilities of building a
coalition with other leftist parties ormoving toward the center
and reach an agreement with the liberals. Not unusually, such
coalition-seeking behavior becomes a salient issue during elec-
tion campaigns in which a fragmented parliament with no
single party majority is expected. In the 2010 UK general elec-
tion, for instance, much debate centered on the possible coa-
lition choices of the Liberal Democrats, and both the Conser-
vative and Labour parties claimed that by voting for the Liberal
Democrats, voters risked supporting a Labour/Conservative
government. Similarly, debates about the possible coalition
allies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Social Dem-
ocratic Party of Germany (SPD) have dominated many elec-
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alitions is salient during election campaigns since it has been
shown to matter for voters, as expectations about postelection
coalition formation can drive the strategic behavior of utility-
maximizing voters in multiparty systems (Duch, May, and
Armstrong 2010; Kedar 2005). In this article, we directly ad-
dress the questions raised by this literature and argue that
coalition signals can influence vote choice above and beyond a
simple impact on voter expectations of government forma-
tion. It is our contention that these signals can, and often do,
enter the voters’ utility function through complementary chan-
nels because signals can have an effect on how voters perceive
the parties: expressing a willingness to favor a specific coali-
tion partner over another can be processed by voters as an
additional piece of information on where the party stands
ideologically and change their perceived distance to the party,
thereby affecting vote choice at the polls.
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1. An alternative strategy employed by the literature is counterfactual
simulation, as pursued by Linhart (2009).
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servational studies that have recently assessed the impact of
coalition behavior on parties’ images (e.g., Adams, Ezrow, and
Wleizen 2016; Falcó-Gimeno and Fernandez-Vazquez 2016;
Fortunato and Adams 2015; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013;
Spoon and Klüver 2017). Second, all these studies investigate
the effects of coalition building post factum, that is, once a
government has been formed. Instead, we specifically focus on
the effect of coalition signals sent during election campaigns
on perceptions about parties, which should be of greater con-
sequence as voters have yet to cast their ballots. Experimental
designs have also been used to study whether and how pre-
election coalition signals affect voters’ strategic or coalition-
directed voting (Goodin, Güth, and Sausgruber 2008; Gsch-
wend, Meffert, and Stoetzer 2017; Meffert and Gschwend
2011), but the question remains as to which mechanisms are
activated by coalition signals that can influence voting, in par-
ticular, the one we propose here: the effect on parties’ perceived
positions. Our design allows testing for these mediated effects
on vote choice.
In the very influential coalition-directed voting model pro-
posed by Duch et al. (2010), the authors argue that the utility a
voter i derives from a party j depends on a number of factors:
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where xi is the voter’s ideological position, and Zcjn is the
position of each possible coalition that party j might enter,
with (perceived) probability gcjn. As for party characteristics,
pj represents the party’s ideological position, andWij is a vec-
tor of nonspatial attributes.
Duch et al. (2010) themselves argue that coalition signals
shape the attractiveness of a party through coalition expecta-
tions (gcjn ): they affect the prospects of those coalitions the
voter may (dis)favor. While this expectation is, of course,
reasonable, we believe it in fact understates the importance
of these signals. When parties signal their willingness to join
a given coalition, they not only make that coalition more
plausible in the eyes of voters. They also send information
about themselves. Through these signals, parties reveal their
political commitments, including their ideological position pj,
which also feed into Duch et al.’s (2010) utility function.
Therefore, in a context with, at least, some uncertainty
as to where a party actually stands—as it is commonly the
case (Fortunato, Stevenson, and Vonnahme 2016)—voters
seeking to figure out the exact position of a party may rely
on coalition signals. Specifically, we expect that a coalitionsignal indicating that a party has the intention to form a
postelectoral government coalition with a party to its right
(left) moves a voter’s perceived position of the party to the
right (left). More formally, we can expect that the perceived
location of a party j that sends a coalition signal sc will de-
pend on the previous perception of where the party stands
(pj) plus the average position of the rest of the signaled coa-
lition partners Zcjn ,2j with respect to the party’s placement.
Parameter t expresses the weight of the contribution of the
coalition signal to the (updated) perception of the party lo-
cation and is expected to be a function, mostly, of the pre-
vious uncertainty on where the party stands, as well as the
intensity of the coalition signal: pjjsc p (12 t)pj 1 tZcjn ,2j,
which, rearranging, gives
pjjsc p pj 1 t(Zcjn ,2j 2 pj): ð2Þ
If we embed this prediction in the noncoalition part of the
model in equation (1), we can easily see why coalition signals
can affect voters’ behavior: not only for coalition-related rea-
sons but also through the change in the perceived ideological
position of the party.IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY: A SURVEY EXPERIMENT
Identifying the causal impact of a coalition signal requires
comparing what happens when an actual signal is sent out in
one direction or another with what would have happened in
the absence of such a signal (Decker and Best 2010). Clearly,
in real world settings the counterfactual cannot be observed
(Meffert and Gschwend 2012). For this reason research has
resorted to experimental designs in which the treatment—
the sending out of a coalition signal—can be manipulated
holding all other variables constant.1 In this article we follow
this strategy, but we seek to balance internal and external
validity considerations by embedding our experiment in a
survey to the general population, fielded in the context of a
real election campaign.The context
We used the 2015 campaign for the regional government of
Valencia, Spain, as our research setting, as it allowed us to
treat the coalition signals of two different parties in a highly
realistic manner. After 20 years of government by the con-
servative Partido Popular (PP), they were generally expected
to lose about half of their votes amid a series of corruption
scandals, economic troubles, and a severe austerity program.
All preelection polls pointed to a highly fragmented regional
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 000parliament with several plausible postelection coalitions as
the likely outcome of the vote.2
Much of the coalition-related discussion during the cam-
paign revolved around a possible leftist alliance between the
Socialists and the two left-wing parties (Compromís and Po-
demos). However, the Socialists deliberately avoided being too
explicit about this possibility and considered alternative op-
tions as well. The emerging center-right liberal party Ciuda-
danos (Cs),3 whom the media expected to enter into an even-
tual agreement with the conservatives, was also intentionally
ambiguous about its intentions during the campaign. Figure 1
represents the Valencian party system and shows that, before
the election, the two parties that might have entered into
agreements in both directions were the social democrats and
the liberals.
Experimental design
Taking advantage of this uncertainty regarding the coalition
choices, we designed an experiment in which we manipulated
suggestions about the favored coalition strategy of two spe-
cific parties: the established social democratic PSPV-PSOE
(Partit Socialista del País Valencià—Partido Socialista Obrero
Español) and the new liberal Cs. We chose these two because
both offered the possibility of making credible statements about
a range of postelection coalition preferences, including no coa-
lition, a coalition to their right, or a coalition to their left. This
choice allows us to fully manipulate the coalition signals but
of course has consequences for the scope conditions of our
findings, as they refer to a case in which the senders had alter-
native potential coalition options in opposite directions.
For each of the two parties, we presented respondents with
a randomly varying vignette in which political analysts sug-
gested either that the party was not willing to form any coa-
lition after the election (Rule Out treatment) or that it was
intending to join a coalition to its right (Cs being the right-2. After the election, the PP did indeed fail to obtain an absolute majority.
In fact, no two parties alone could command more than 50% of the seats: any
majority coalition required at least three. Negotiations among the leftist
parties started immediately after the election, although the Socialists also
considered the possibility of an alliance with the liberals and the abstention of
the conservatives to bypass the leftist demands. In the end, a leftist coalition
was formed.
3. The term “liberal” here is used in the classical liberalism sense, rather
than referring to progressivism.leaning partner for the PSPV-PSOE and the PP the rightist
partner for Cs) or to its left (the PSPV-PSOE being the leftist
partner for Cs, and a combination of left-wing parties the
partners for the PSPV-PSOE). The experiment also included a
control group that received a placebo text simply stating that
there would be a regional election, meant to control for the
regional election priming effect of the treatments. In table 1 we
present the basic structure of the 3# 2 design and placebo,
resulting in seven different treatments. The table presents the
headlines of the vignettes, while the original vignettes and
complete texts (original and translated) can be consulted in
appendix F (apps. A–F available online).
The vignettes were designed so as to make a credible claim
that one of the two parties would favor a specific coalition
strategy after the election. To avoid outright deception, the
claim was attributed to undefined political analysts but pre-
sented as being based on the party representatives’ line of
thinking. While this is not a signal sent directly by the party,
it can fit in a nonstrict definition of a coalition signal, since
signals can provide “reliable clues about which potential co-
alition partners a party implicitly prefers” (Decker and Best
2010, 168).
The experiment was fielded during the May 24, 2015, re-
gional election campaign (May 12–18) to an online sample of
1,003 respondents from the Valencia region (143 per experi-
mental condition, on average), drawn from an online panel by
the company Netquest, using age and education quotas. De-
tails on the composition are discussed in appendix B. After the
treatment was administered, we asked our respondents about
the perceived left-right position of the parties (on a 0–10 scale)
and the declared probability of voting for each party in the
upcoming regional election (propensity to vote, PTV), rang-
ing from 0 (“I would never vote for this party”) to 10 (“I am
sure I will vote for this party”).RESULTS
First, we assess whether our treatments were effectively able
to shift postelection coalition expectations, as expected in
Duch et al. (2010). Reassuringly, results show that our vi-
gnettes significantly affected the expectations of postelection
coalition behavior of the liberals (x2 p 67:99, p ! :001) and
had a more modest effect, although still statistically signifi-
cant, for the Socialist Party (x2 p 28:22, p ! :001). We dis-
cuss these effects in detail in appendix C.Figure 1. Valencian 2015 party system
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the coalition signals on the perceived left-right placement of
parties. For the liberals, the suggestion that their party might
form an alliance with the conservative party does have the
expected effect. On average, it is placed almost half a point
further to the right on the 0–10 left-right scale with respect
to the placebo condition. In contrast, ruling out any coalition
or suggesting an agreement with the social democratic party
does not make any difference with respect to the control
group. For the social democrats, in turn, we find a similarpattern: suggesting a coalition toward the right moves their
perceived position almost half point to the right (significant
only at the 90% level). Signaling a left-wing coalition does
not seem to produce an update in respondents’ priors with
respect to the Socialists’ ideological stance. In this case, also,
ruling out any coalition whatsoever has an almost significant
effect on the party’s perceived position, moving it to the right
compared to the position reported by the control group,
perhaps because of the strong prior held by most voters that
they would form a left coalition.Table 1. Treatment HeadlinesLiberals Social DemocratsRule out Analysts suggest that Ciudadanos will not
make any agreement after the electionAnalysts suggest that the PSPV-PSOE will
not make any agreement after the electionRight-leaning coalition Analysts suggest a possible agreement
of Ciudadanos with the PPAnalysts suggest a possible agreement of the
PSPV-PSOE with CiudadanosLeft-leaning coalition Analysts suggest a possible agreement
of Ciudadanos with the PSPV-PSOEAnalysts suggest a possible agreement of the
PSPV-PSOE with Compromís, EUPV,
and PodemosControl The Valencian Parliament, renewedNote. EUPV p Esquerra Unida del País Valencià; PP p Partido Popular; PSPV-PSOE p Partit Socialista del País Valencià—Partido
Socialista Obrero Español.Figure 2. Ideological placement (90%–95% confidence intervals, marginal effects vs. placebo)
4. To avoid using posttreatment information to define a pretreatment
condition, we took the average of attributed positions to Cs and PSPV-
PSOE in the placebo group (6.2 and 3.9, respectively) as the reference
points to consider a voter’s left-right placement to the right or to the left of
the party.
5. The analyses have been run with the R package mediation (Tingley
et al. 2014) and models estimated through ordinary least squares. Further
details, robustness checks, and sensitivity analyses can be found in app. E.
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the parties, while others did not. A detailed discussion on
why this might be the case is beyond the scope of this article,
but we can outline some conjectures. First, pretreatment ef-
fects might make some of our treatments stronger/more
credible. Second, signals toward coalitions that are closer to
where the party stands a priori should have weaker effects.
And third, coalition signals might have an effect on non-
spatial elements of the party image, such as the extent to
which citizens perceive it to be an office-seeking, as opposed
to policy-seeking, agent. We have some evidence (discussed
in app. D) that, indeed, the coalition signals were also able to
move perceptions of the parties’ priorities in terms of office
versus policy considerations.
Certain coalition signals, therefore, seem to exert a sig-
nificant effect on at least one element of the function that
allows voters to evaluate from which party they can derive
greatest utility, in accordance with Duch et al.’s (2010) CDV
model. But do these effects in turn shape voters’ willing-
ness to vote for the party sending the signal? Through their
impact on the perceived position of (and distance to) the
party, these signals should also affect vote choice in elections.
Therefore, the question is really whether mediated effects of
coalition signals exist.
To test this idea we ran a causal mediation analysis in
which two models were estimated. First, we take the me-
diator as the dependent variable (in our case, the distance
dij p (xi 2 pj)
2 that weighs in the utility function). Specifi-
cally, dij p a2 1 b2sijc 1 ε2i, where sijc refers to the treatment
variable (the coalition signal in our case). Then, predicted
values are generated at two different values of the treatment,
sijc p 1 and sijc p 0, which gives d̂ij(1) and d̂ij(0), respec-
tively. A second model is estimated in which the dependent
variable is the actual outcome of interest (in our case, the
PTV for the sender of the signal): PTVij p a3 1 b3sijc 1
vdij 1 Xi 1 ε3i, where Xi is a set of relevant covariates (in
our case, party identification, political sophistication, gender,
age, and age squared). Then, PTVij is predicted at sijc p 1, first
setting dij p d̂ij(0) and then dij p d̂ij(1). The average dif-
ference of these two predictions is, according to Imai et al.(2011), a consistent estimate of the average causal mediation
effect (ACME) of the treatment.
In our case, we expect a positive ACME of the coalition
signal through pj, but only in the case of those for whom the
signaled coalitional behavior should make the party a more
attractive option, that is, for voters who are on the same
side of the ideological spectrum as the signal. Therefore, the
ACME of a left- (right-) leaning signal is calculated for those
to the left (right) of the party.4 Indeed, as table 2 shows, a
signal indicating that the liberal party is likely to reach a
postelectoral agreement with the conservatives appears to
give them an electoral boost among right-wing voters by mov-
ing the party’s perceived ideological position to the right.5
In order to provide an illustration of the substantive im-
portance of this result, we can calculate the total effect of the
right-leaning signal on the PTV for Cs. It would have a neg-
ative impact of 20.74 points on the PTV for those voters
located to the left of Cs and a positive impact of 1.25 points for
those located to the right of the liberals. Although translating
a PTV change into a change of actual vote shares is far from
straightforward and requires a strong set of assumptions, for
purely illustrative purposes we can present an approximate
figure. If we regress a dichotomous variable, taking a value
of 1 if the respondent’s declared intention is to vote for Cs and
0 otherwise, on the PTV, we obtain an average marginal effect
of about 5.7 percentage points for each additional point of
PTV. Therefore, a right-leaning signal from Cs would imply
roughly a loss of 4.2 percentage points among the voters lo-
cated to its left and a gain of 7.1 among voters to its right.
These figures, in a fragmented scenario, are potentially highly
relevant in terms of viable coalitions and the likelihood of
participating in government.Table 2. Average Causal Mediation Effects on Propensity to VoteLiberals (Cs) Social Democrats (PSPV-PSOE)Left Leaning Right Leaning Left Leaning Right LeaningPosition (pj) 2.007 .592** .058 .054Note. Cs p Ciudadanos; PSPV-PSOE p Partit Socialista del País Valencià—Partido Socialista Obrero Español.
** p ! .05.
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According to the findings presented in this article, parties
should be careful when suggesting a specific postelection co-
alition behavior during the campaign, as it might not only
make the suggested choicemore likely in the eyes of the voters,
but it could also influence how the party itself is perceived by
voters. Our results show that our experimental manipulations
of preelection coalition signals not only were able to affect
respondents’ coalition expectations but also had an impact on
the perceived ideological position: a right-leaning coalition
signal shifted both parties’ perceived ideological stances to the
right (around 0.5 points on a 0–10 scale). We have also shown
that coalition signals can enter the vote decision through this
mechanism.
Several questions remain open. First, coalition signals might
matter differently for established and new parties, depending
on the prior information voters have about party preferences.
Our results, which show a greater effect for the new party,
point in that direction, but of course we are not able to make
any general statement. Second, coalition signals might have
effects on other party images, beyond their influence on the
perceived location in the left-right dimension. They could be
interpreted by voters as signals on the relative salience of dif-
ferent issues for the party and could also reveal information
on the party’s willingness to trade off policy concerns for office
opportunities.
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A R             
In the main text we present our main results in figures. Table A.1 presents the mean values
(and 95% confidence intervals) of our outcomes of interest across treatments, together with the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals.
Table A.1: Left-right perceived position. Average values, by treatment group
Liberals Social-democrats
Mean [95% CI] Mean [95% CI]
Placebo 6.07 [5.73 – 6.41] 3.86 [3.56 – 4.17]
Rule out 6.14 [5.85 – 6.43] 4.17 [3.83 – 4.51]
Right-leaning 6.54 [6.24 – 6.84] 4.29 [3.96 – 4.62]
Left-leaning 6.19 [5.84 – 6.53] 3.72 [3.39 – 4.05]
2
B S     
As discussed in the paper, the sample on which we run the experiment was collected on-line,
among the panel members of the commercial company Netquest. The panel does not allow
for self-registration, so participants were actively recruited by the company. Also, a number
of controls on professionalization and bad quality responses are put in place by Netquest.For
detailed information on the sample, see their Panel Book available on-line.
In the sampling process, we introduced age and education quotas to reduce the bias of
on-line samples towards the younger and more educated. Despite these quotas, the sample still
under-represents older voters, especially the over-65s. Table B.1 compares the basic socio-
demographics of our sample with the data from a face-to-face probability sample fielded during
the same period as ours by the o cial Spanish government center for sociological research:
The 2015 pre-election survey for the Valencian Community.
As it can easily be seen in the table, our sample deviates significantly in that it over-
represents younger and more educated respondents, and also leans towards the left of the
ideological spectrum. We have not been able to find any heterogeneous e ects of our treatments
that might suggest that this sampling issues might bias our treatment estimates, but nonetheless
this is always a concern with non-probability samples.
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Table B.1: Sample composition and di erences vis à vis a prob-
ability sample
Sample CIS survey Di erence
Education
No education 0.1 7.1 -7
Primary 1.7 15.9 -14.2
Secondary 28.2 43.5 -15.3
Professional 29.9 16.2 +13.7
University 40.1 17 +23.1
Gender
Female 52.1 51.1 +1
Male 47.9 48.9 -1
Age
18 to 24 13.9 7.4 +6.4
25 to 34 23.4 17.3 + 6.1
35 to 44 32.1 21 +11.1
45 to 54 19.7 18.3 +1.4
Over 55 10.9 35.9 -25
Ideology
1 (Extreme left) 4.4 4.9 -0.5
2 13.5 4.4 +9.1
3 19.1 11.4 +7.7
4 13.8 19.6 -5.9
5 31 30.6 +0.4
6 7.5 10.5 -3.0
7 6.5 8.6 -2.1
8 2.1 6.5 -4.4
9 0.8 1.9 -1.1
10 (Extreme right) 1.4 1.6 -0.2
Left-right scale in the experiment was measured in a 0-10 scale.
We collapsed the 0 an 1 categories for comparison
4
C M                       R                 
In this section we present the results of a randomization check and the manipulation checks we
included at the end of the questionnaire. Table C.1 shows the share of correct and incorrect
answers to a manipulation check included at the end of the questionnaire, in which we asked
respondents to recall what the vignette they just read was about. They were given three options
(corresponding to the di erent treatments for each part) plus and additional ‘Don’t know’ option.
In the placebo condition they received an alternative manipulation check in which they were
asked to recall which type of elections the vignette was referring to (regional, local or general).
Results indicate that for all treatments, 80.3% of the respondents got it right, while around 19%
failed the manipulation check or answered ‘Don’t know’.










ts Placebo 78.8 17.12 4.11
Alone 78.7 9.33 12.0
Lib-Con 89.5 3.8 6.8










ts Placebo 78.8 17.12 4.11
Alone 81.2 12.9 5.8
SD-Lib 76.3 11.8 11.8
SD-Left 80.0 10.71 9.29
Row percentages
In table C.2 we present the output of a multinomial logistic regression model in which we
regress treatment assignment on a number of individual characteristics measured pre-treatment.
We include both the standard sociodemographics (education, gender, age) as well as political
variables such as political knowledge, interest in politics, ideology and closeness to each party.
Results show how, despite some occasional significant coe cients, the overall model does not
fit the data better than a null model, as shown by the statistically insignificant  2 test of the
whole model.
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Table C.2: Randomization test: Multinomial logit on treatment
assignment
T1 A T2 A T3 A T2B T3B Placebo
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Political Sophistication -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.22 0.03
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Interest in politics -0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.22 0.03 0.12
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Education -0.12 -0.28** -0.05 -0.19 -0.22* -0.10
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Gender 0.03 0.02 -0.25 -0.13 0.03 -0.16
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Age 0.06* 0.01 -0.06** 0.02 0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age squared -0.00* -0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left-right 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.21** 0.25***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Party Closeness
Cs 0.10 0.21* 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.06
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
PP 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
PSPV -0.19* -0.23** -0.09 -0.19* -0.18 -0.22*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Compromís -0.02 -0.20 -0.09 -0.16 -0.18 0.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
IU 0.36** 0.38** 0.14 0.34** 0.16 0.16
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Podemos -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant -0.69 0.75 0.28 0.36 0.03 -0.61






* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
T1B is the reference category
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D A          D         V        
D.1 Treatment e ects on coalition expectations
In order to determine whether our manipulations did have an e ect on respondents’ expectations
of post-election coalitions, at the end of the questionnaire, we asked our respondents which
coalition behavior they thought was most likely for each party. This allows us to test Duch
et al.’s (2010) conjecture that coalition signals influence voters’ coalition expectations. In
table D.1 and figure D.1 we can see how the vignettes significantly a ected the expectations of
post-election coalition behavior of the liberals and the socialist party.
Table D.1: Treatments by post-treatment expectations. Row per-



















Placebo 60.27 18.49 21.23
[0.048] [1.155] [-1.029]
Alone 45.33 14.00 40.67
[-4.299] [-0.593] [5.401]
Lib-Con 84.96 3.76 11.28
[6.679] [-4.270] [-4.017]






















Placebo 26.03 62.33 11.64
[0.664] [0.517] [-1.483]
Alone 18.18 62.34 19.48
[-1.976] [0.539] [1.605]
SD-Lib 37.04 45.19 17.78
[4.055] [-4.167] [0.844]
SD-Left 15.71 71.43 12.86
[-2.639] [3.035] [-0.986]
Pearson  2=28.22, p<.001
Adjusted residuals in brackets
In the placebo condition, 60% expected a right-leaning coalition, 18% a left-leaning coalition
and 21% did not expect the liberals to join any coalition whatsoever. Under the rule out treatment,
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Figure D.1: Spine plots by party. Bars indicate treatment conditions and colors refer to





















the share of respondents that expected the liberal party to choose to be alone after the election
doubled up to 40%, while in the Right-leaning treatment condition, those that expected such
an agreement add up to 85%. The left-leaning treatment seems to have been perceived as less
credible for our respondents, but nonetheless it increased the proportion of people expecting
such a coalition from 18% in the placebo group to almost 25% in the treatment group.
In the case of the social-democrats, our manipulations had a somewhat weaker e ect on their
expected post-election coalition behavior. In the control group over 60% expected a coalition
with the leftist parties, 26% a coalition with the liberals and only about 12% of the sample
did not expect the social-democrats to join a coalition. The no coalition condition doubles this
share up to 19.5%, while under the right-leaning treatment those that expect such a coalition go
up to 37%. Finally, among those that received the left-leaning treatment, over 70% expected
such a coalition to occur.
Overall, these results show that the treatments a ected the participants’ expectations about
the post-election coalitions. The fact that the e ect is clearer for the new, liberal party Cs than
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it is for the established social-democrat PSOE can relate to di erences in the amount of prior
information voters have with regards old and new parties although, of course, other di erences
between the two parties could be driving this particular result.
D.2 Non-spatial characteristics: O ce-seekingness
Existing evidence is scare, if not entirely absent, as to the extent to which coalition behavior
impacts other aspects of a party’s image, beyond perceived ideological placement. This is
particularly surprising given the abundant literature that examines the conflicting goals of
parties when having to decide between o ce, policy, or votes (e.g. Müller & Strøm, 1999). If
a conflict does exist between these three objectives, it must be because seeking o ce at times
requires adopting political strategies that some voters may lament. Among these, the process
of choosing coalition partners in order to enter o ce is likely to be significant.
This possibility is important in the context our our experiment because a change in the
perceived propensity to seek o ce could, in theory, act as a substitute of a change in the
perceived ideological placement. A party signaling its willingness to join a coalition with a
party to its right(left), can be regarded by voters as disclosing its ‘true’ position to the right(left)
of where it stood, or on the contrary, as more willing to compromise its ideological stance in
exchange for o ce.
A fairly direct way to test the implications of this argument is to evaluate the e ect that
coalition signals have on voter perceptions of a party’s propensity to seek o ce vs. its propensity
to seek to implement its policy objectives (‘o ce-seekingness’ vs. ‘policy- seekingness’). In
principle, the announcement of an intention to form a coalition with another party is likely to
make voters believe o ce is the party’s main priority. By contrast, a signal indicating that
the party ex ante rules out any possibility of forging alliances with other parties following the
election is likely to increase voter perception of the ideological ‘purity’ of the party: attaining
o ce would not be achieved to the detriment of policy priorities. It is true that, theoretically,
there is nothing in the decision to join a coalition that is intrinsically less policy-seeking than
staying in opposition. Indeed, failing to gain o ce may well entail the formation of a government
that implements policies which are further removed from the preferences of the party (and its
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voters) than would have been the case had the party entered a coalition government.
Nonetheless, here we assume o ce and policy priorities to present a trade-o  for parties
(at least in the minds of voters), and we used a measurement instrument based on this idea
of a trade-o . Hence, there are reasons to believe that a government coalition signal will
weigh in the ‘o ce-seekingness’ image of the party (and, by extension, downgrade its policy-
seeking image). In order to measure ‘policy-seekingness’, we employed a 4-point scale, ranging
from ‘Its top priority is reaching o ce’ to ‘Its top priority is its political platform’, with the
intermediate points being ‘It is mostly concerned about reaching o ce, although it also cares
about its political platform’ and ‘It is mostly concerned about its political platform, although it
also cares about reaching o ce’.
Figure D.2 shows the treatment e ects on this outcome measure. As it can be seen, the
coalition signals do not modify the social-democratic party’s image, while only the Liberals–
Social-democrats treatment has an e ect on the respondents’ perception of the liberals. When
exposed to this treatment, respondents tend to see this party as being less policy-seeking (and
more o ce-seeking) than in the other conditions. Again, it seems that coalition signals only
a ect party images when there is greater uncertainty as to the political commitments of the
party (as is presumably the case with new parties).6
6 Note that in these two cases, the variance of perceived policy-seekingness of the liberal party
is much higher than for the social-democratic party.
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In this section we discuss some additional analyses conceived as robustness checks. First, we
focus on the issue of the respondents that failed to recall the contents of the vignette at the end
of the survey. Then, we present alternative specifications of the mediation analysis.
E.1 Non-compliance
We run the analyses of the paper excluding those respondents that did not answer the manipu-
lation check correctly. Results, presented in tables E.1 and E.2, prove essentially stable, so our
main conclusions are not critically driven by inattentive respondents in either direction, despite
the reduction of the sample size and the slightly wider confidence intervals.





Placebo 6.11 [5.72 – 6.50]
Rule out 6.24 [5.92 – 6.55]
Right-leaning 6.64 [6.32 – 6.96]
Left-leaning 6.32 [5.92 – 6.72]





Placebo 4.09 [3.76 – 4.41]
Rule out 3.99 [3.60 – 4.35]
Right-leaning 4.26 [3.93 – 4.59]
Left-leaning 3.73 [3.38 – 4.08]
However, if we characterize the failure to respond the manipulation checks correctly as
an instance of non-compliance to our treatment, we are facing an issue of two-sided non-
compliance. Respondents that, despite receiving a certain manipulation do not process it as
such —due to inattentiveness, motivated reasoning or any other reasons— can be thought of
as non-compliers in our experiment. In this conceptualization of the problem, the treatment
e ects estimated so far would equal to Intention-To-Treat e ects, and simply dropping the non-
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compliers from the analysis would result in biased estimates of the treatment e ects. In order
to get a more valid estimation of the treatment e ects, we can compute the Complier-Average
Causal E ect (CACE), using treatment assignment as an instrument of the response to the
manipulation check (Gerber & Green, 2012; Imbens & Rubin, 2015). In tables E.3 and E.4 we
compare the ITT (estimated via simple OLS regressions) and the CACEs, estimated via 2SLS
in which treatment assignment becomes an instrument of actual reception of the treatment. As
expected, the IV analysis produces larger estimates of our treatment e ects, but there are not
any other important changes with respect to our baseline estimation.












* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01













* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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E.2 Mediation
Here we present a replication of the mediation analyses with controls in the first equation. The
ACME estimates that they yield are very similar to those provided in the main text.
Table E.5: Average Causal Mediation E ects on PTV (with controls in the first equation)
Lib (Cs) SocDem (PSOE)
Left-leaning Right-leaning Left-leaning Right-leaning
Position (p
j
) -0.029 0.588** 0.011 0.053
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Mediator equation: di j = ↵ +  1CSi j +  2OtherCSi +  3PIDi j +  4Sophisticationi
+ 5Educationi +  6Femalei +  7Agei +  8Age
2
i + ✏i


















Additionally, we run sensitivity analyses to test the extent to which our estimations of the
average mediation e ects hinge on the sequential ignorability assumption. The intention of these
analyses is to show how sensitive are the results to a violation of this assumption, namely that
there is no confounder we have not accounted for that have e ects on both the mediator and the
outcome. Figure E.1 plots the true ACME against the sensitivity parameter ⇢ that indicates the
degree of correlation between the error terms in the mediator and outcome regression models.
The note below the figure shows how large should be the sensitivity parameter for the ACME to
disappear (vertical red line in the plots). As it can be seen, the Average Causal Mediated E ect
of the right-leaning signal of the liberal party that operates through the distance perceived by
the voter to the party seems rather robust: the ⇢ that would make the indirect e ect to vanish is
large enough (greater than |.3|).
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Distance (dj): Lib. (right−lean.)
NOTE: ACME=0 at ⇢ =  .32. 90% CI displayed.
15
F T         
Finally, we present the vignettes as they were received by our subjects, together with an English
translation of each one.
Figure F.1: Vignette Ciudadanos - Rule Out
Translation: Analysts suggest that Ciudadanos will not make any agreement after the
election. Several political analysts agree that, given the statements and signals sent by
the party, there is a high probability that, following the upcoming regional elections of the
24th of May, Ciudadanos will not join a coalition with any other political party. The party
wants to confirm itself as a government alternative for the Valencian region.
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Figure F.2: Vignette Ciudadanos - Popular Party
Translation: Analysts suggest a possible agreement of Ciudadanos with the PP. Several
political analysts agree that, given the statements and signals sent by the party, there is
a high probability that, following the upcoming regional elections of the 24th of May,
Ciudadanos will join a coalition with the Popular Party, if results allow. Several gestures
made by the party point that this will probably be the chosen option.
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Figure F.3: Vignette Ciudadanos - Socialist Party
Translation: Analysts suggest a possible agreement of Ciudadanos with the PSPV-
PSOE. Several political analysts agree that, given the statements and signals sent by the
party, there is a high probability that, following the upcoming regional elections of the
24th of May, Ciudadanos will join a coalition with the Socialist Party, if results allow.
Several gestures made by the party point that this will probably be the chosen option.
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Figure F.4: Vignette Socialist Party - Rule Out
Translation: Analysts suggest that the PSPV-PSOE will not make any agreement after
the election. Several political analysts agree that, given the statements and signals sent
by the party, there is a high probability that, following the upcoming regional elections of
the 24th of May, the PSPV-PSOE will not join a coalition with any other political party.
The party wants to confirm itself as a government alternative for the Valencian region.
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Figure F.5: Vignette Socialist Party - Ciudadanos
Translation: Analysts suggest a possible agreement of the PSPV-PSOE with Ciu-
dadanos. Several political analysts agree that, given the statements and signals sent
by the party, there is a high probability that, following the upcoming regional elections of
the 24th of May, the PSPV-PSOE will join a coalition with Ciudadanos, if results allow.
Several gestures made by the party point that this will probably be the chosen option.
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Figure F.6: Vignette Socialist Party - Left Parties
Translation: Analysts suggest a possible agreement of the PSPV-PSOE with Compro-
mís, EUPV and Podemos. Several political analysts agree that, given the statements and
signals sent by the party, there is a high probability that, following the upcoming regional
elections of the 24th of May, the PSPV-PSOE will join a coalition with Compromís, EUPV
and Podemos, if results allow. Several gestures made by the party point that this will
probably be the chosen option.
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Figure F.7: Vignette Placebo
Translation: The Valencian Parliament, renewed. The upcoming 24th of May, regional
elections in the Valencian Country will be held. The result of these elections will contribute
to defining the regional government for the next term. In this occasion, 2,236 polling
stations will be set up all over the valencian geography
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